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Introduction 
Why is it that the Middle East should remain an anomaly for political scientists· seeking to 
understand its myriad contradictions? On the one hand, it is by majority an ethnically and religiously 
Arab-Islamic region. On the other, the infusion of Western influences,· colonial legacies, religious and 
ethnic minorities, resource disputes, fratricidal rivalry and the Jewish-Israeli dilemma throw the region 
into a tailspin of disorder and insecurity. The region has its problems like any other, but unlike many 
other regions that have managed to overcome their interstate squabbles, the countries of the Middle 
East lag far behind the rest of the world in peace, prosperity, security and stability. 
Although many reasons have been given for the debilitating state of affairs in the Middle East, it 
is arguably the Arab-Israeli conflict which has been the most prominent issue. This paper attempts to 
explain the lack of regional integration in the Middle East with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli (and 
the more narrow Palestinian-Israeli) rivalry that has dominated the region for over 60 years. This will be 
done by first taking into account destabilizing aspects of the Middle Eastern conundrum in a historical 
context and comparative perspective to better understand why regional integration has been achieved 
in many other parts of the world, but not in the Middle East. Once, this is done, the use of realist and 
regionalist theoretical frameworks will help to better explain the cynical presumptions and pessimistic 
patterns of thinking that run rampant among leaders in the region and inhibit. mutually beneficial 
relations. 
In order to break out of the deadlock that the determinacy of realist theories force upon the 
theoretical analyst, theories of conflict resolution wUI be explored. By combining liberal-informed and 
optimistiC conflict mediation and negotiation theories with realism's explanatory power, it is argued that 
a more multi-dimensional picture of Middle East's predicaments will emerge, more susceptible to 
conflict resolution and thus to increased regional integration. Finally, perhaps the most pressing issue in 
the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the division in the holy city of Jerusalem. The inability to find a 
workable solution to the city means that it is continuously relegated to final status talks; in other words, 
the primacy and visibmty of the Jerusalem problem translates into the ongoing polarization and 
radicalization of would-be moderates in the region, stifling peace and security in the region for all actors 
involved. This paper argues that a Middle Eastern regionalization process is possible only if the core 
concern, Jerusalem, is tackled head-on and finally resolved. 
THE STATUS OF REGIONALISM 
How deeply or widely a regional system is integrated is often a matter of dispute. Absolute 
figures in terms of immigration and trade flows are useful in the economic sense while confidence-
building-measures such as transparency in troop movements and disarmament campaigns are helpful in 
the military-security sense, but these figures are meaningless without some meaningful context within 
which to place them. For that reason, a comparative historical perspective is the most commonsensical 
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approach to take when measuring levels of positive or negative regional integration and development, 
whether concerning Europe and East Asia (Beeson 2005) or competitive US- European strategies in Latin 
America (GrugeI2004). In a comparative spirit, a brief overview of regionalism or regional integration in 
diverse parts of the world will first be undertaken, followed by a closer look at the lack of regionalism 
between the states of the Middle East. 
Regional Integration Worldwide 
In all corners of the. globe, processes of regional integration are giving birth to regional 
organizations that bring together many different states with a shared purpose. Most times, that purpose 
is ostensibly economic; witness, for instance, the similarities between the North American· Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). These regional associations both 
aim to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, services, people and capital according .to 
neoliberal theories Qf mutual benefit and absolute advantages (Duina and Buxbaum 2008). It is often 
neoliberal theories expounding the benefits of the increased trade flows and mutual interdependence 
that accompany globalization that are most accepted in these types of regional institutions. There is one 
big difference between the two Americas, however: security concerns were made irrelevant in the 
creation of NAFTA, which merely added Mexico to the already existing Canadian-American free trade 
agreement of the 1980s (Baggs and Brander 2006). In the case of MERCOSUR, the two founding 
members, Brazil and Argentina, used the inauguration of the Southern Common Market to help them 
overcome their mutual hostilities, incorporating other regional members, Uruguay and Paraguay, to help 
balance out the institution (Amayo 2007). In both cases, nevertheless, the incentive of mutual economic 
rewards encouraged member-states to join and profit from regional integration. 
For other organizations, however, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the uniting factor can be geopolitical in nature. In 
essence, the strategic rationale behind the decision of the member-states to join these regional 
groupings was the achievement of national security through the maintenance of international peace and 
stability (Chung 2008). It was essentially the border disputes between the Central Asian republics that 
came to the forefront in the years following the Soviet Union's collapse that provided the impetus for a 
regional security organization. With regional giants Russia and China sandwiching the region, it was only 
natural for both to take an active interest in the stability and peaceful resolution of disputes between 
their energy-rich and potentially quarrelsome neighbors (Haas 2007). Due to the difficulty of any 
regional power establishing its hegemony in Southeast Asia, tike Indonesia's, ASEAN was formed in 1967 
to provide a forum for discussion and transparency between states. At the height of the Cold War, the 
autocratic rulers decided that instead of fighting one another, they would focus instead on a policy of 
nonintervention and for the most part nonalignment in the Cold War (Wanandi 2005). By infusing their 
security concerns with realist prescriptions, conflict was minimized between states that had little to gain 
from it in any case. 
Finally, there are others who have already graduated to the point where the economic and the 
political benefits are considered inseparable. The obvious example here is the hallmark of regional 
integration upon which much of the literature is based, the .European Union (EU), but the members of 
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the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCe) have also evolved from a collective defense organitation to take on 
a wide range of economic goals (Nonneman 2006). With its humble beginnings in the European Coal and 
Steel Community, and later on the European Common Market and Economic Community, the European 
integration project began as a security measure to prevent German rearmament after the Second World 
War, but has lately become much more of a politico-economic mega-project. There ·has been much 
debate about the ramifications of pooling sovereignty and the emergence of a new supranational 
political space in much of the European regionalist literature (Thumer and Binder 2009). The GCC was 
also initially formed out of the insecurity and instability rampant in the Persian Gulf throughout the Iran-
Iraq War during the 1980s. Originally banding together as a security community in collective defense, 
the original aim of the Arab Gulf states has been expanded more recently to include, thanks to 
substantial and exceptional on and gas revenue, greater economic projects (Oar and Presley 2001). 
Many more regional organizations and r'ationales exist, but there is no need to mention all of them. The 
important point is that many such organization exist and that they are multiplying. 
The 'Paradox' of the Middle East: The Lack of Regionalism in the Middle East 
In direct contrast "to the previously mentioned examples of regions engaging in healthy and 
mutuany beneficial actiVities of regional integration, the paradox of the Middle East has been aptly 
captured by its description as a "region without regionalism" (Aarts 1999, 911). The proliferation of 
regional groups that have been sweeping across the globe over the past six decades has largely skipped 
over the Middle East. In comparison to other regions, it has the lowest relative degree of regional 
cooperation in the contemporary world. Aside from the ongoing Arab--Israeli conflict, which renders any 
attempt to achieve an all-embracing regionalism pointless, Arab countries have essentially failed to 
create any long-term regional unity among themselves; it seems that the only uniting factors for the 
majority of Arab states are their mutual hostility of Israel and wavering degrees of support and 
sympathy for Palestinians. Therefore, the Middle East has remained synonymous with conflict, 
insecurity and instability insofar as structures for regional peace, security and stability have not been, 
and are unlikely to soon be, created. 
The trend in a globalizing world then seems to be one of increased regionalization, but this has 
not quite been the desired result in the Middle East. At this point, it would be wise to define the region 
in question before continuing. Although there is no generally agreed upon definition for the boundaries 
of the Middle East, the most commonly employed one is the area enclosed by five seas: the Black, 
Caspian, Mediterranean, Persian and Red Seas. Therefore, the Middle East can be said to encompass the 
geographical region of Israel, Iran, Turkey and all Arab states East of Egypt (Kilchevsky et at. 2007, 648). 
This is a more or less contiguous geographic region that shares a common type of landscape, semi-arid 
climate and drastically uneven distribution of natural resources, whether renewable but limited~ like fish 
and freshwater, or finite but abundant, like oil and gas. 
The region is one of the oldest in the world, having been continuously inhabited for thousands 
of years. Whereas other regions can commonly relate to a collective cultural or religious identity, the 
Middle East ties at the crossroads of three continents and is home to a wide range of different peoples. 
When it comes to that which divides the region, however, it seems that there is no shortage of reasons, 
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excuses, rationaJes or explanations for the lack of regional unity in the Middle East. In an attempt to 
explain the lack of regionalism in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, analysts give many reasons, but the most 
frequently cited are: religion, nationalism and colonialism. For the sake of space, only these three 
central factors will be examined here. 
As to the role of religion, regional integration in the Middle East is undermined not only by inter-
religious conflicts, but also by intra-religious disputes. In fact, although the three monotheistic faiths 
tracing their lineage to the patriarch Abraham - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - are often thought of as 
monolithic blocs in direct conflict with each other, this view is not very accurate. A recent study has 
shown that intra-religious disputes are much more common and much more lethal than inter-religious 
conflicts (Svensson 2007, 934). This means that Muslims will fight Jews with far less frequency than they 
will fight each other, often along three fronts. First and foremost, the Islamic World can be divided into 
two broad camps, the extremists and the moderates. The extremists are the fundamentalist, religious 
zealots often associated with terrorism and typically united by their hatred towards the United States 
and Israel, like Iran, Syria, Hamas and HezboJlah. The moderates are typically backed by the United 
States, formally if not tacitly friendly with Israel and value stability and security at the regional level 
above ideology. Secondly, Islam can be divided between Sunni and Shiite branches of the religion, 
analogous to Catholics and Protestants but rooted much further in history. Regional pariahs like Iran and 
Hezbollah are fundamentally Shiite entities, which has historicalfy been persecuted by the SiJnni 
majority in the Islamic faith. Thirdly, religion pJays in a Muslim's lifestyle in the Middle East a role far 
more intensive than in the secular West (An-Na'im 1999; Khalili 2(07). The above three points suggest 
that the difficulty encountered in bridging the religiously rooted obstacles to regional integration can be 
found also within the same religion. 
Usually interwoven within religious identity is the ideology of nationalism, which presents an 
especially volatile combination in the Middle East. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the Western-backed 
Arab regimes installed during the interwar period were replaced by military dictatorships or republican 
forms of government in popular revolutions and coups d'~tat. Arab nationalism became known as 
panArabism, an effort to bridge the artificial borders between Arab countries created by the legacies of 
great power colonialism (Zoli 2008). This was aided immensely by the combined Arab opposition to 
Zionism, which by those years had become synonymous with Israeli nationalism. Zionism propagated 
the desire for Jewish immigration to the land of Israel after two millennia living in the Diaspora, a move 
widely seen in the Islamic World asan extension of Western imperialism and domination (long 2009). 
Because both types of nationalism espoused strong connections to the land, agricultural farming and 
settler communities came to symbolize both peoples' claim to the land. This possessive colonization of 
the land on both sides became even more complicated by the rise of Palestinian nationalism in the 
1960s, which for the first two decades of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been eclipsed by the ideals of pan-
Arabism (Gerber 2008). Today, the Palestinian-Israeli standoff has come to represent the core of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, showcasing the inevitable challenges that arise in overcoming nationalism and 
arriving at a resolution of the conflict acceptable to all sides involved. 
Both the religious and the nationalist dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its detrimental 
effect on Middle Eastern regional integration have to be considered in light of colonialism'S lasting 
effects. For instance, not only were the colonial powers of Great Britain and France Christian as opposed 
to the Muslim masses in the Middle East, but they imposed their Western conception of nation-
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statehood on a region which had for thousands of years been held together by imperial' rule. This mea nt 
that borders were often drawn' on maps with little concern for geography, topography or national 
realities on the ground; witness the problems that have plagued the region because of the Kurdish 
population's displacement among the four so-called nation-states in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran (Berwari 
and Ambrosio 2008). Ever shice the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine that led to the 
estabfishment of the State of Israel, any Western support for the Jewish State is seen as a revival of 
Western imperial and colonial practices in a new guise. Hence, the appeal of the propaganda 
disseminated via the airwaves byal-Qaeda figureheads like Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri of 
a Muslim's retigious duty to wage jihad - holy war - against the "Zionist-Crusader alliance and their 
collaborators" (PBS On line NewsHour). It is thus comprehensible how the scars of colonialism continue 
to inform the worldviews of a region already reeling from the indulgence in rengious and nationalist 
conflicts. 
Considering the lack of unifying factors from refigious disagreements to nationalist tendencies to 
its colonial past, the region fails to offer convincing evidence of regional integration. Little to no 
intraregional trade means little intercultural contact, which leads to hostile relations on both sides. 
Nearly three decades after Egypt and Israel signed a historic peace treaty, Egypt's top'cultora'l official, 
Farouk Hasny, in 2008 replied to a reporter when asked if any Israeli books were featur"ed in an 
Alexandrian library, "Burn these books; 'if there are any there, I will myself burn them in fr"ont of you" 
(BBC World News). Similarly, Israel's controversial Foreign Minister, Avigdor lieberman, has publicly said 
that Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, should pay the Jewish State an official and diplomatic visit, but 
that Nif he doesn't want to come, he can go to hell" (ltan et al. 2008). Both sides have since offered 
apologies, but the tension simmering under the surface of a peace treaty that has long gone cold 
remains and complicates the pursuit of increased peace and security through regionalism. 
THEORmCAl REALISM AND REGIONALISM 
The point has been sufficiently made that a serious and significant lack of regional integration 
plagues the Arab-Israeli Middle East. In order to fully comprehend why this is the case, an explanatory 
theory is neected with the power to expose the inner workings of Middle Eastern politics. For this task, 
the in sights afforded by realist scholars of various stripes will help to explain the actions taken and the 
decisions made by the numerous heads of state in the region. An in-depth focus on Barry Buzan's {1991} 
theorizing of regional security complexes will then provide a useful analytical tool for portraying the 
interconnectedness of all state actors involved. Finally, Patrick M. Morgan's (1997) discussion of regional 
orders as hypothetical security ladders to be climbed combines realist and regionalist theories to place 
the Arab-Israeli Middle East, a regional security system, along a regional security spectrum. 
Many sCholars have found realist theory to be a useful framework within which to investigate 
world politics. Realist theory addresses the key questions that Quincy Wright originally envisioned for 
the field of international relations: "What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what 
are the conditions for cooperation and peace among them?" (Wright 1935). As one of the most conflict-
prone region in the world, the same questions could be asked about the current state of affairs in the 
Middle East. The underlying logic of regional processes will hopefully be clarified after examining some 
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of the central realist assumptions about states along with the propositions that realists derive from 
those core assumptions. 
Beginning with the first of realism's three core assumptions, the nation-state is seen as the 
fundamental unit of political organization in international politics. It is the main actor on the world stage 
and continues to wield what Weber denotes a "monopoly on the legitimate use,of physical force" 
(Weber 1919). This means that although non"state actors may still use violence for their own ends, the 
state is the only body that can legally go to war with other states. In other words, "the state is the 
principal actor in that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among states are the most 
important determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment" (Gilpin 1981, 
17-18). If states are the main regional actors, how do non-state actors, like terrorist groups Hamas and 
,Hezbollah, continue to destabilize the Middle East? For one, it would be impossible for them to exist ' 
without the explicit support of like-minded states Iran and Syria. Secondly, the goats of these non-state 
entities' are still state-oriented: either to destroy a state, like Israel, or to establish their own state, I~ke 
Palestine. Therefore, states are still the "basic actors in the international system" since "the behavior of 
other actors ... is conditioned and delimited by state decisions and state power" (Krasner 1985, 28). 
Once it is assumed that the state is the key unit of action in the international arena, the second 
assumption deals with the nature of state behaviour. They are said to "behave in ways that are, by and 
large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms" (Keohane 1986, 7). State 
rationality, from a realist viewpoint, has at least three elements; realists assume that states are goal-
oriented, that these goals are consistently ordered from most to least desirable and that states devise 
strategies to achieve these goals (Grieco 1997, 165-166). It naturally follows that states are "sensitive to 
costs" and will inevitably alter their strategies as external constraints and opportunities change, after 
learning from their own negative experiences and by observing what has succeeded and failed for other 
states (Waltz 1986, 331). A good example of state rationality involves two Arab-Israeli wars six years 
apart. In the morning hours of June 5, 1967, Israeli fighter jets caught Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian 
armies unaware and practically obliterated their aerial forces, allowing Isra,el to claim victory against 
impossible odds in the Six-Day War. After recognizing that only a surprise attack would enable them to 
gain the upper hand in battle, Egypt and Syria secretly mobilized their armies along the Israeli border 
and launched a two-pronged attack on Israel when it was most vulnerable, on the holiest day of the 
Jewish calendar, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 
The third of realism's three assumptions moves beyond the state as the referent object and 
tackles the international system instead. Although the state remains the main guarantor of authority in 
the domestic sphere, there exists no comparable enforcer of security at the international level. That is to 
say, war "lurks in the background of international politics just as revolution lurks in the background of 
domestic politics" (Carr 1964, 109). This absence of a central and reliable authority above individual 
states is what realists caft the condition of international anarchy. International relations can thus be seen 
to "take place in the shadow of war, or, to use a more rigorous expression, relations among states 
involve, in essence, the alternatives of peace and war" (Aron 1973, 6). This vibes with another essential 
realist idea: the inevitability of war means that states can only rely on themselves for physical defense. 
Professor Alan Dershowitz, a vocal supporter of Israel, defends the Jewish state's bellicose behaviour by 
making this exact point: "Israel's permanent security must be assured against enemies both external and 
internal. Until and unless that occurs, Israel must continue to maintain a qualitative military superiority 
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over the combined armed forces oflts potential enemies as the best assurance of peace in the region, 
since Israel can count on no one else to assure its survivar' (Dershowitz 2003, 241). 
Combining realism's three main assumptions about states - that they are the main actors in 
international poUties, that they can be. considered rational actors, and that they coexist in a context of 
international anarchy -leads to key propositions about their essential character and how they choose to 
interact with other states. Chief among these propositions is that states are first ··and foremost 
concerned with power and security. Yet, the definition of power and its relation to security have been 
and remain contested issues. Hans J. Morgenthau, an early proponent of realist theory, characterized 
international politics as a struggle for power and justice, but in his view the struggle for power tends to 
prevail. In fact, he argued that statesmen "think and actin. terms of interest defined as power" 
(Morgenthau 1948, 5) and this due to the "limitless character of the lust for power [whkh] reveals a 
general quality of the human mind" (Morgenthau 1946, 194). This conception of power certainly 
requires clatifications and has been questioned and criticized on several fronts, in particular: the 
inadequacy of using human nature to .explain the occurrence of international conflicts (Waltz 1959, 39); 
the apparent inability to distinguish between the tangible and intangible elements of power, namely 
between power as a resource and power as influence over otherS' behavior (Keohane 1986, 11); and, 
even more important, the lack of a clear distinction between power as an end in itself and· power as a 
means to an end, a concept in line with T.R. Fox's instrumental view of power, based on Bertrand 
Russell's definition of power as "the capacity to produce intended effects" (Fox 1988, 234). 
As to the relation between .power and security, the fundamental question is whether the 
maximization of power or the maximization of security should by sought. Realist theory easily 
acknowledges that the quest for power is not identical to the quest for security. Power is relational; as 
Morgenthau points out: "the concept of power is always a relative one" (Morgenthau 1948, 12). This 
could be and is often interpreted as leading to a so-called zero-sum game in which one state's gain is 
invariably another state's loss, while, obviously, "one state's security is not necessarily every other 
state's insecurity. Greater security, like greater prosperity, but unlike dominant power, is an objective 
toward which it is at least conceivable that an states can move simultaQeously" (Fox 1944,11). But the 
realist insistence on the relativity of power clearly rejects the idea of dominant and absolute power. The 
relativity of power, therefore, could also be interpreted as suggesting a necessary subordination of 
power to other objectives, notably security, thus stressing the instrumental nature of power. Clearly, in 
this case, the so-caned the zero-sum nature of power will give way to the absolute-sum nature of 
security, in which states can either gain or lose, depending on the degree of cooperation and 
collaboration with one another. Given realism's emphasiS on states as self-help and rational agents, "it 
would follow that if a state had an opportunity to increase its power, but this conflicted with its goal of 
security maximization, then the state ... would forego the former in favour of the latter" (Grieco 1997, 
167). Similarly, Waltz notes that "in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can 
states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power" (Waltz 1979, 126). Power, then, can 
never be seen as an end in itself, but just as one in a list of many means for achieving (inter)national 
security. And that realism gener~lly favours the maximization of security, not the maximization of 
power, is demonstrated with luminous clarity by its main theory of international relations: the Balance 
of Power Theory. 
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Regional Security Complex (RSC) Theory 
The utility of the regional level theories as opposed to realist-inspired theories is the 
incorporation of the supranational element in the theoretical analysis. The following analysis defines 
Buzan's (1991) regional security complex with its accompanying ideas of global overlay and patterns of 
. amity/enmity before moving on to Morgan's (1997) regional order concept as a security ladder. By 
tweaking with realism's precepts and taking into account regional-level theories, the predictive ability of 
the theory grows beyond the level of the state and factors in the nature of the regional system, situated 
somewhere between the national and the global levels of analysis. 
To this point, the term region has almost exclusively been used to refer to. the Middle East, that 
is, the geographical region bounded by five seas and comprising the geographical region of Israel, Iran, 
Turkey and all Arab states East of Egypt (Kilchevsky et al. 2007, 648). The region referred to as the Arab-
Israeli Middle East logically subtracts the non-Arab states of Iran and Turkey from that list, leaving Israel 
splashing about in a sea of exclusively Arab states. The basic unit of analysis here is really the regional 
security complex, a concept devised by Barry Buzan (1991) to describe a specific kind of region united by 
common security problems. In such a complex, the member-states are so interrelated in terms of their 
security that actions by any member, and significant security-related developments within the domestic 
sphere of any member, are recognized as having a major impact on the others. Regionalism in the Arab-
Israeli Middle East, lacking any meaningful economic or cross-cultural-normative component, will be 
analyzed in terms of regional security. Consequently, as opposed to the general tendency to exclude 
Israel from regional frameworks, here it is argued that this exclusion cannot be permitted to continue. 
Buzan defines a regional security complex (RSC) as a "group of states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another" (Buzan 1991, 190). Thus, the central elements in these complexes are the 
security relationships between each member-state and any elements of interdependence that concern 
security. Security, like power, is a concept liable to change with time, and has been the object of heated 
debate in the past few decades. Scholars generally tend to acknowledge that security is a relational 
concept centered on the existence of a danger or a threat, and as Buzan points out, the security of an 
individual actor is relevant only if considered in light of the systemic interdependence it shares with its 
fellow components in the system (Buzan 1991, 187). Despite major disagreements concerning the width 
and depth of the concept, the Mfddle Eastern RSC is likely for some time to continue to be defined in the 
traditionally reatist sense as pOlitical and military threats against the government, territory and/or 
population of the state (Buzan 1997; S(l)renson 2006). Furthermore, RSCs wilf in all likelihood continue to 
"be of much greater importance for coping with security issues and problems than in the past, and the 
management of order and security will increasingly be found [in these RSCsJ, especially if regional 
conflicts continue to flourish" (Morgan 1997, 31). 
The concept of RSC is intended to emphasize that while regional security processes differ 
considerably from the global system,. they may still refract the impact of that global system. Reflecting 
the bipolar Cold War system in which the theory was developed, any foreign powers' penetration into 
the regional system is defined as overlay, driven by the global-level conflicts and concerns behind great 
or superpower foreign policies. Further refinement of the concept might characterize the RSC in terms 
of its degree of autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system since under the condition of 
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overlay, regional-level dynamics cannot reasonably be considered apart from globaf.:level dynamics; on 
the other hand, if no great or superpower conflict drives penetration into regional complexes, then 
overlay loses much of its relevance (Morgan 1997, 25-28). The Cold War had a dual effect on regional 
conflicts, on the one hand internationalizing otherwise local conflicts and .on the other suppressing 
otherwise explosive interactions. In the Arab-Israeli Middle East, competitive arms racing behaviour no 
doubt increased the likelihood of either side resorting to war to achieve security, but it also created an 
eventual balance of power in which neither Israel nor the combined might of its Arab neighbours could 
decisively emerge victorious from armed combat. In the post-Cold War world, the United States' 
influence can still be felt. 
There are numerous dimensions along which RSCs can be seen to differ and might reasonably be 
of theoretical interest, but Buzan (1991) has proposed for this to be done in terms of their patterns of 
amity and enmity. While RSCs are mostly generated by patterns of conflictual relations,hence the focus 
on . traditional, politico-military issues of security, the theory accommodates variations in degree of 
conflict. This use of the amity/enmity spectrum is logical since "in seeing each other as relevant to their 
national security interests, each member-state must respond to perceived or actual threats and conflicts 
among themselves and, in the same fashion, to perceived or actual security relations that are friendly, 
indifferent, or [hostile}" (Morgan 1997, 31). Decades into the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Kingdom of 
Jordan and Israel both began to see each other's securities as inextricably linked. This connection was so 
profound that when Syrian troops prepared to invade Jordan in 1970 in support of Palestinian guerillas 
threatening to topple the King, the stability of superpower overlay allowed Israel to come to the 
moderate monarch's aid and maintain the regional balance of power although the two countries were 
technically still at war. 
Regional Order/Security Ladder Theory 
Much different from a regional security complex, however, is Morgan's (1997) notion of a 
regional security order. These regional orders are patterns of conflict management that can be used to 
rank a specific regional secui"itycomplex -like the Arab-Israeli Middle East - along a theoretical security 
ladder from most to least integrated. While a security complex tends to have elements of more than one 
of these ideal types of orders, one is usually "dominant in terms of states' preferences, perceptions and 
strategies" (Lake and Morgan 1997,12). In order from most to least ordered and secured, the list of 
. regional orders is as follows: integration, pluralistic security community, collective security, great-power 
concert and power restraining power or balance of power. The list of regional security orders can be 
thought of as rungs on a ladder to be climbed by RSCs as they pursue regional cooperation and conflict 
management (Morgan 1997, 32-33). In this sense, the top of the ladder corresponds most closely to 
liberal ideas of regional cooperation and the bottom effectively mirrors realism's pessimistic view on the 
inevitability of conflict and the spontaneous emergence of a regional balance of power. Evidently, the 
example of the EU in Europe rests atop the ladder while the situation 'in the Arab-Israeli Middle East 
resides at the bottom. 
Since the Middle East is said to be located on the bottom rung of the security ladder. it would be 
prudent to discuss the implications of achieving security via the use of power to restrain power. In 
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traditional politics, this is often referred to as the balance of power, which is often characterized by a 
prevalent form of power distribution that it is argued leads to stability and security for an within the 
system. This distribution of power may be dominated by one state in a unipolar system as popularized in 
the hegemonic stability theory (GiJpin 1971; Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 1984). The balance of power 
may also be dominated by two great/superpowers in a bipolar system as was largely the case during the 
Cold War (Waltz 1979). Finally, the distribution of power may not be dominated by anyone or two 
powers, but spread diffusely among three or more great powers in a multipolar system, like the Concert 
of Europe was between the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars (Wait 1987; Mearsheimer 2001). 
In the Middle East, it is often unclear in which direction the balance of power tends to shift. 
Conceptual and empirical problems plague researchers' attempts to assess this distribution of power: 
"The Arab system in the 19505 and 1960s stood between an unbalanced multipower system and a one-
power system, although it more closely resembled the latter" (Noble 1991, 63). It was simply unclear 
how superpower overlay and the Israeli factor impacted Egyptian ambitions for regional hegemony. 
Egypt and Israel were often seen at two opposite ends of a bipolar system for most of the Cold War, but 
this is problematic since no Arab state would openly admit to support. Israel, although some did so 
tacitly (Pervin 1997, 274). Towards the end of the Cold War and as the balance shifted drastically in its 
favour, Israel was seen as an aspiring hegemon that "intervene[d] at will, unchallenged, from Baghdad 
to Beirut" (Hudson 1984, 156). Recently, the balance of power has come to be supplemented by three 
interesting ideas: the balance of threat in which physical or actual power is supplanted by perceived 
power (Wait 1987), the checkerboard pattern in which neighbours are li<kely to be opposed while more 
distant countries are likely to be allied (Rustow 1989) and the tendency to balance rather than 
bandwagon in order to avoid a unipoJar system dominated by Israel (Sayigh 1993). 
Although the balance of power is difficult to determine in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, the hope 
is that the regional order can provide a model with which to determine where on the proverbial security 
ladder the RSC resides. If the traditional realist rung of the ladder at power restraining power can be 
surpassed, perhaps the Middle East can graduate to the next stage: security via a concert of great 
powers. In a concert, regional security is the collective responsibility of the most powerful states in that 
complex, whose actions derive legitimacy by providing order and security as a common good 
(Rosecrance 1992). Importantly, a concert makes the provision for each major state's vital interests and 
the right to participate in the concert so that each curbs their own foreign policies accordingly. The 
concert therefore contributes to regional security in two ways. "First, it embodies the determination of 
the major powers to mute and manage their own conflicts. Second, it provides a vehicle for them {with 
which they can] cooperate to deal with other security issues" (Morgan 1997, 34). As a mechanism for 
conflict management, regional orders differ according to the levels of amity and enmity characterizing a 
certain RSC. As relations of enmity become less charged and eventually morph into ones of amity in the 
Arab-Israeli Middle East, perhaps the elusive balance of power will give way to a multipolar concert. 
Theories of realism and regionalism offer powerful conceptual tools for deciphering the maze of 
interwoven and often complex intra regional processes. While realism uses the core tenets of classical 
political thought to rationalize the decisions of cynical and pessimistic national leaders, regional theories 
are more helpful in reconciling the diverging and typically opposing national interests of individual state 
leaders within a broader and more inclusive security-critical regional context. RSCs first establish the 
actors and their relationships within the region so that regional orders can be conceived of as methods 
149 
to manage regional conflicts. The expected manner of conflict management in the Arab-Israeli Middle 
East is the traditional realist concern with the balance of power, but as history has repeatedly shown, 
this method of managing conflictual relations is beset with difficulties. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES 
Theories can be powerful tools since they paint a mental picture of how and why the world 
works the way it does. In this sense, noting the difference between explanatory and prescriptive types of 
theories makes all the difference (Brown and Ainley 2005). Realism provides an excellent explanatory 
theory for understanding the continuity of war and peace in international politiCS because it bases its 
predictions on the belief that all states are primarily motivated by the quest for economic and mifitary 
power and security. Furthermore, realism posits that war is ultimately inevitable, either because of 
imperfections in human nature that render man prone to warlike tendencies (Morgenthau 1948) or 
because of constraints imposed by an anarchic international system on states wishing simply to survive 
(Waltz 1979). What regional theories add to this image of internatio'nal relations is the ability to 
construct mechanisms for managing that inevitabifity of conflict, apparatuses for conflict management. 
Coincidentally, where a permanent resolution of the conflict is the desired aim instead of a 
momentary management of it, the limits of explanatory theories are exposed and the utility of 
prescriptive theories become evident. Conflict resolution theories do not ignore the explanatory power 
of rea.fism, but "the furthest that the reatist can be persuaded to go is the moderation, limitation and 
channeling of conflict, not its abolition" (C/inton 2007, 245). Therefore, the benefit of these theories of 
conflict resolution is that they provide points of overlap with more optimistic liberal theories capable of 
transcending realism's deterministic outlook on the intractability of certain conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli 
one. The following sections will first delve into the origins of the prescriptive theory along with some of 
its basic tenets and then explore ways in which the Arab-Israeli conflict can be ended peacefully. 
Conflict Resolution's Origins and Classical Ideas 
The field of conflict resolution, even from its origins in the 1950s and 1960s, has always been a 
controversial enterprise. Realism has leveJed some of the most stinging criticisms at the burgeoning 
discipline. This is not surprising if it is remembered that "rivalry, suspicion, confrontation: these are the 
relations that rea fists find most iUuminating about international politics" (C/inton 2007, 248). If this is the 
case, why should realists have seen conflict resolution as anything other than "soft-headed and 
unrealistic, since in their view international politics is a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable 
groups, in which power and coercion were the ultimate currency? Might not lasting peace more often 
result from decisive military victory than from negotiated settlement? And might not third party 
intervention merely prolong the misery?" (MiaU et at ,1999, 3). These types of questions plagued the 
nascent field, but it was consistently argued that conflict resolution would in time "incfude not only 
mediation between the parties but efforts to address the wider context in which international actors, 
domestic constituencies and intra-party relationships sustain violent conflicts" (Mialf et at. 1999,4). 
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In terms of some of the core ideas representative of conflict resolution's origins, the decision 
was made early on to distinguish between the positions held by diametrically opposed actors and their 
underlying interests and needs. Imagine two neighbours quarreling over a tree that each claims is on his 
land, but it toms out that the interest of one is in using the tree's fruit while the other's is in having the 
shade. Two opposing positions can be reconciled by identifying the interests of each and then finding 
mutually compatible albeit modified positions that allow each to meet their original interests. Matters 
become more complicated when the conflict is over values" which are often non-negotiable, or 
relationships, which may need to be fundamentally reconfigured to resolve the -conflict. Some analysts 
consider the denial of profound human needs, like identity, security and survival, to be at the root of 
many intractable conflicts (';,lIiall et al. 1999, 9). Thus, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is essentially a battle 
for national survival on both sides, but identity and security are prime motives behind the conflict. 
Moreover, as long as the conflict is translated into the language of needs, an outcome that bridges the 
gaps in each side's interests and positions can, in theory, be found. 
Third party intervention, as has been the case with the United States in the Arab-Israeli Middle 
East since 1967, has 10ng been recognized as a dynamic-changer in any conflict. Where two parties are 
reacting to each other's actions without a third party to act as the arbiter and mediator, misperception 
sets in and it is easy for a spiral of hostility and escalation to develop. The entry of the third party alters 
the conflict structure by allowing a "different pattern of communications to emerge, one in·which the 
third party can filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviours of the conflict parties" (Miall 
et al. 1999, 9; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). The conflict resolver's view of power is also slightly more nuanced 
than that of the realist and possesses three 'faces': threat, exchange and integrative power. Threat 
power is similar to the realist conception of the ability to command, order and enforce, or 'hard power', 
while the next two are closer to 'soft power'. Exchange power is associated with bargaining and the 
compromising approach whereas integrative power is seen as persuasion and transformative long-term 
problem-solving (Boulding 1989; Miall et al. 1997, 10). Third parties may use all three faces of power, 
but circumstances both internal and external to the conflict will dictate how successful they are. 
From Preparing for Peace to Peace Processes 
After reviewing some of the basic points of the study of conflict resolution, the analysis now 
turns to more practical considerations. Conflicts in the Middle East are rarely ever fought between 
evenly matched opponents; even during the Cold War, it was the effects of superpower overlay that 
enabled the combined might of the Arab states to reach strategic and military parity with Israeli forces. 
Asymmetrical conflicts usually erupt between a majority and a minority, or between an 
established government a;nd a group ·of rebels; both apply to the Palestinians living in Israel. Here the 
root of the conflict risks surpassing the issues and interests dividing the parties by taking on a structural 
tone, where the root of the conflict becom~s bogged down in the uneven structure of roles and 
relationships between the actors (Miall et aJ. 1999, 12). In a unipolar order where the hegemon is 
despised, the only way to resolve the conflict is to change the structure. Since this is often not 
immediately beneficial to the stronger side, it is the role of the third party to assist in the structural 
transformation by convincing the de facto oppressor that the role of hegemony carries with it heavy 
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costs that are unsustainable over the long term and will ultimately lead to its downfall (Gilpin 1981; 
Dreu et at 2008). The role of the news media in asymmetrical conflicts in the Middle East is not simply 
negative; it has also the power· to change minds and create environments conducive to peaceful 
relations between former enemies. This was precisely the case in 1994, where the media prepared both 
publics for the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty (Wolfsfeld et a!. 2008). 
While most studies on the peaceful settlement of disputes see the actual content of proposals 
aimed at resolving the conflict as essential to it success, more attention has recently bee.n paid to its 
timing. In other words, parties resolve their problems only when unilateral and alternative measures 
have led to unsatisfactory and uncomfortable ends. Third parties must be aware that old proposals 
suddenly become attractive when all other options have evaporated since "ripeness of time is one of the 
absolute essences of diplomacy" (Campbell 1976, 73). The concept of a ripe moment in conflict 
mediation also centres. on the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) for both sides. This is 
where asymmetry loses some of its bite because both sides face costs and pressures resulting from the 
continuity of the conflict. The MHS is also fully consistent with realism's assumption of rationality, which 
states that a party wit! choose its goals carefully from a consistent and prioritized . list of objectives. 
Finally, ripeness is also a perceptual event, so if the partie.s themselves are not cognizant of the 
readiness of the conflict to be resolved, it is the task of the third party to point out the costs and 
benefits associated with the continuation or the resolution of the conflict (Zartman 2003, 19-20). 
Many attempted peace initiatives faU to reach the negotiation stage, but if they do, mUltiple 
phases of the process become routine. At least seven phases have been identified: the pre-talks phase, 
an era of secret talks, the opening of multilateral talks, negotiating for a settlement, gaining 
endorsement, implementing its provisions and institutionalization of the new dispensation (Guelke 
2003, 56). Without going into detail about each stage, suffice it to say that the first two are invaluable in 
initiating the dialogue that may lead to reconciliation; in the case of Palestinians and Israelis, it was only 
in 1993, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles, that both sides even recognized each other's 
legitimate rights to exist in peace and security. Shimon Peres, the current Israeli President and an avid 
negotiator of the 1993 Oslo Accords, has said that if the Palestinian-Israeli agreement were not 
conducted in secret, away from the spotlight of the media - unlike the following years Jordanian-Israeli 
peace treaty - the agreement was unlikely to have surVived public scrutiny (Pe res 1993). Nevertheless, 
these phases are not definitive; they only suggest optimal time periods for negotiating an end to violent 
conflicts. 
JERUSALEM - THE CITY OF PEACE? 
When it comes to peace accords, and this is truly poignant in the case of Israel-Palestine, the 
problem of exclusive state sovereignty, whether over a city or larger territory, has long dogged efforts to 
resolve final status talks in the contested city of Jerusalem. The inflexibility of state sovereignty and 
state borders in the face of demands for separation and statehood steers states towards the granting of 
limited autonomy and provision for minorities (Darby and MacGinty 2003, 137). This stems directly from 
the fact that regional actors consider their. own national securities without proper consideration for the 
security of others the region asa whole, feeding the security dilemma that overrides any chance of 
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regional unity and reconciliation between former enemies (Suzan 1991). Any resolution to the 
contested status of the city of Jerusalem will have to take into account the divergent positions, interests 
and needs of both Arabs and Jews (not to mention Christian minc>rities), but most importantly those of 
Palestinians andlsraetis. 
Controversially, some have even gone so far as to say that a comprehensive peace between 
Palestinians and Israelis that resolves all conflicting issues - Jewish settlements/outposts, the right to 
return of Parestinian refugees, final borders, water sharing, economic viability, security strategy and, of 
course, Jerusalem - is not possible nor should it continue to be advocated (Miller 2008). Backing away 
from this. fatalistic view of the world is the only feasible option; like an problems in the world, the 
solution for this one has simply not yet been found. Considering that over the course of thousands of 
years, Jerusalem has been destroyed twice, besieged 23 times, attacked 52 times, captured and 
recaptured 44 times and been privy to at least 118 separate conflicts (Cline 2005), it only makes sense to 
discover the contested city's relevance for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. What follows is an in-depth 
look at why the city of Jerusalem is so important for each of the three faiths, followed by some political 
approaches to pragmatic problem-solving and creative political solutions. for the city of Jerusalem. The 
order of religions chosen reflects their chronological development on Earth, not a personal preference. 
Relevance for Judaism 
There is no city in the world that has played a bigger role in atJ of Jewish history than Jerusalem. 
The first Prime Minister of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, said it himself in a speech to the Israeli 
Knesset, or Parliament, in 1949: "We regard it as our duty to declare that Jewish Jerusalem is an organic 
and inseparable part of the State of Israel, as .it is an inseparable part of the history of Israel, of the faith 
of Israel" (Jewish Virtuallibraryb). This view is commonly shared among Jews wherever they may reSide, 
not just within fsrael. Furthermore, Jerusalem is specifically mentioned over 800 times in the Hebrew 
Bible, Jews the world over pray in its direction three times a day and for thousands of years have 
finished the Passover service in the hope of repeating it 'next year in Jerusalem!' (Gabay 1999). 
Historically speaking, it is impossible to separate the history of Jerusalem from its religious and 
cultural significance for the Jews. Circa the year 1000 BCE,King David conquered the city for the 
Kingdom of Israel and it quickly became the political, cultural and religious capital. Nearly 40 years later, 
King Solomon would build the First Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, a place from which Israelite priests 
would make animal sacrifices to their God and pilgrims from all over Ancient Israel would gather three 
times a year for key rituals. The First Temple Era lasted nearly 400 years until both the city and the 
Temple were burned and looted by the invading Babylonian forces in 586 BCE. For 70 years thereafter, 
the Israelites prayed daily for its speedy rebuilding in future days, and managed with the help of the 
Persian King Cyrus to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple once more in 516 BCE. For close to 
600 more years, Jerusalem remained the centre of Jewish life in Ancient Israel under the yokes of 
Persian, Greek and Roman imperial rule (lr David Foundation). 
At the end of the Second Temple Era in 70 AD, tragedy struck (again) when the city of Jerusalem 
and the Jewish Temple were both razed to the ground by the Romans. This date marks the beginning of 
153 
a two thousand years Jewish Diaspora, during which mtlfions of Jews were killed, ensl'aved or uprooted 
from their homes and scattered throughout the known world, an event that rivals the Nazi Holocaust in 
the Jewish psyche. For close to 2000 years, the Jews wandered the Earth, homeless in strange lands, but 
always there remained in Jerusalem a tiny Jewish population that treasured the remnants of their once 
mighty past, a section of the Second Temple which the Romans by chance left standing: the Western 
Wall. 
The city of Jerusalem was divided in the aftermath of the 1948-49 Ara.b-Israeli war, leaving the 
Western Wall, the holiest site in Judaism, in Arab hands. Therefore it was considered truly miraculous 
when against atlodds the Israelis captured the Old City of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War and after 
2000 years in exile achieved full sovereignty in their ancient homeland. Upon reaching the Western Wall 
for the first time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan summed up the Jewish zeitgeist succinctly: "We 
have returned to at. that is holy in our land. We have returned never to· be parted from it again" 
(CAMERA). The notion of relinquishing parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians just decades after fighting 
and dying for the 'eternal' capital of Israel is a troubling one for most Israelis. 
Relevance for Christianity 
Although the Christian connection to the city of Jerusalem (and elsewhere in Israel/Palestine) is 
significant, it is of a more spiritual and religious nature as opposed to a territorial and political one. In 
other words, there exists no 'Christian-nationatrst' movement based in Jerusalem comparable to Israeli 
nationalism for Jews or Palestinian nationalism for Muslims. Nevertheless, the life and death of Jesus 
Christ - the rock of Christian faith - is deeply embedded in Jerusalem's story. According to the Christian 
Gospels, it was drca the year 30 - 33 AD that along with preaching and healing in the Temple courts (he 
was, after all, Jewish), Jesus' last Supper, .his arrest in Gethsemane, his trial, his crucifixion at Golgotha, 
his burial nearby and his resurrection/ascension all occurred within the gates or atop the nearby hills of 
Jerusalem (luke 2; Mark 11, New Revised Standard Version). 
In the years after Jesus' death in 33 AD; Christianity had to find a way to surmount the Jewish 
claim to Jerusalem. With the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple (and by extension Jerusalem) and 
the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora in 70 AD, physical ownership of the city was impossible during the 
formative days of the Christian religion. Thus, the essential nature and meaning of Christian Jerusalem 
quickly became spiritualized and delocalized in the early Christian context (Eters 1987). From its centre, 
Christianity radiated to other cities and towns beyond Palestine and throughout the Roman Empire. 
When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the 4th century AD, Constantine 
the Great ordered the Church of the Holy Sepulcher built to commemorate Jesus' final ordeals on Earth. 
As more churches and Christian domiciles were constructed and pilgrims continued to grow in numbers, 
Jerusalem became a phYSically Christian city in addition to a spiritual one (Microsoft .Encarta). 
For hundreds of years after the Arab conquest in 637 BC, the Christian population of Jerusalem 
lived under foreign rule. Their persecution and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher's destruction spurred 
on the Crusades of the 11th to 13th centuries, aimed at IjberatingChristian Jerusalem from 'infidel 
hands'. Regardless of whether the Christian or Muslim armies won the day, the native Christian 
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community was always seen as collaborating with the enemy and was frequently slaughtered or exiled 
from the city (History Channel Ontine)~ Since the time of the Crusades, communities both native and 
foreign have been jockeying for ownership and administration of the churches in the city of Jerusalem. 
For example, while the precincts and fabric of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher are claimed by the three 
major denominations of the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Latin Roman Catholic churches, 
on the very same plot of land, the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox, Ethiopian Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox 
orders all possess certain rights and small properties (Jewish Virtual Ubrarya)! 
The contentious nature of inter-church politiCS has resulted in a fragile status quo. The Christian 
sects residing in Jerusalem are more fearful of and hostile to each other than their Jewish or Muslim 
counterparts since all religions within the city's walls respectfully stay out of one another's affairs. By 
extension, as long as their religious and spiritual rights are protected by the ruling power's authority, the 
Christian population in Jerusalem remains passive and reclusive. Furthermore, the lack of any religious-
nationalist movement aimed at establishing a Christian state atop Jerusalem ensures that the Christian 
community has little to fear from the turbulence caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Relevance for 'stam 
Unlike the inseparability of Judaism's historical development from its religious and political roots 
in Jerusalem, the separation must be made between the religious and political aspects of Islam's historic 
claim to the holy city. Religiously speaking, Jerusalem is not mentioned once by name in the Qur'an, yet 
all Jewish and Christian claims to Jerusalem are subsumed within Islam since it sees itself as the natural 
continuation of and final link in the three Abrahamic faiths. Interestingly, this means that venerated 
Jewish and Ch~istian leaders like Moses, King David, King Solomon and even Jesus Christ himself are 
considered Islamic prophets, so their connections to Jerusalem inevitably take on an Islamic character. 
Jerusalem was also designated as the first Kibtah, or direction of prayer, for Muslims before Mecca, 
though this has become more of a theological non-issue today (Encyclopedia Britannica). 
The Dome of the Rock, a shrine for pilgrims, and the al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest in Islam, 
are widely believed to be built atop the ruins of the Second Jewish Temple and almost directly above the 
Western Wall, the holiest site in Judaism. Needless to say, this is a source of constant tension and strife. 
Perhaps the most important religious nugget of all is Muhammad's mystical nighttime journey in 620 AD 
where he is supposed to have been flown to the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem - though it would not be 
built until many years after Muhammad's death - on a winged horse where he led the 'Islamic' prophets 
in prayer, visited heaven and was then returned safely to the Sacred Mosque in Mecca. Some maintain 
that this metaphysical experience was 'not a physical experience but a visionary one' (Armstrong 1997) 
while others literally accept the story word-for-word (Noble Sanctuary Online Guide). Whether or not it 
actually happened, this miracutous,event makes Jerusalem a holy city in the eyes of Muslims worldwide. 
Whatever the strength of the religious bond between Islam and Jerusalem, politically, it Should 
be noted that the city has never served as the capital of a sovereign Muslim state and has never been a 
major cultural or scholarly centre of gathering for Muslims. It has even been argued by looking at major 
turning points in Islam's history that the religious stature of the city inevitably swells for Muslims when 
Jerusalem assumes political significance but shrinks when the utility of the city has expired. An often 
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cited test case is the 20-year period ·of Jordanian sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem during 
which time no foreign Arab or Muslim leader visited the city (Pipes 2001). In any case, Muslim political 
demand for Jerusalem has taken off like a rocket ever since the status quo of a divided Jerusalem was 
shattered by the Israeli reunificationof the city in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War. From that 
date on, Palestinian nationalism has been intimately linked to the establishment of Muslim sovereignty 
over the Arab half of Jerusalem. This is the nature of the Muslim claim to the holy city. 
Problem-Solving and Pragmatic Solutions 
Evidently, the religious side of the Jerusalem debate cannot be ignored, but faith is just' one part 
of the conflict. While the Jews claim the city of Jerusalem as the eternal (and as of 1967 the undivided) 
capital of Israel, the Palestinians claim the Arab half of East Jerusalem as their future capital city in an 
independent Palestine. The Jerusalem conundrum has become so divisive that even the negotiators of 
the famous 1993 Oslo Accords, credited with the attempt at Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation, recognized 
that at least 5 more years of confidence-building measures would be needed before addressing the 
status of the city of Jerusalem (Isseroff 2002). Similarly, many of the most recent peace initiatives such 
as the Quartet Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative follow in Oslo's footsteps by attempting to 
resolve the secondary issues without even touching upon Jerusalem (Abu-Daya and Mann 2007). In 
contrast to the well-meaning albeit ineffective trend in the literature to procrastinate on the final status 
talks of Jerusalem, it is absolutely essential to regional peace and stability that the resolution of the holy 
city's status precede any realistic peace settlement between Palestinian/Arab Muslims and Israeli Jews. 
One of the main hurdles to overcome in the dry's status is the issue of sovereignty. Obviously, 
neither side will willingly sacrifice it. Therefore, what is needed is a mechanism that allows sovereignty 
to be shared, not mutually exclusive. Although this is still mainly a theoretical construct, aJl practicable 
solutions have been more or less exhausted in the 6O-year long struggle; it is only by creating original 
solutions that the Arab-Israeli conflict will be resolved. An extremely versatile combination of strategies 
like resource expansion, compensation, issue linkage, functional diVision, sharing and delegation have 
been used in the approach to tackling the sovereignty issue. A number of hypothetical solutions have 
already been proposed for the city, but none of them have found practical resonance (AI bin 1997). 
Similarly, questions of sovereignty inevitably become entwined with the question of power-sharing 
(whether federal or municipal). This has led some to suggest autonomy or partition for Palestinians in 
Israel while stn! others break the concept of power-sharing down into the consociational or group-
building block approach and the integrative approach, both of which contain relative strengths and 
weaknesses, and none of which have been successfully applied to Jerusalem (Sisk 2003). 
Little so far has bee.n said about the two-state solution: the idea that a separate and Palestinian 
state should coexist alongside the current Jewish State of Israel, albeit with slightly modified borders. 
This model has grown in popularity in the past two decades as the only way out of the present crisis and 
would look something like the following: ''West Jerusalem can be the capital of Israel; East Jerusalem the 
capital of Palestine, and each state can exercise control over its respective holy shrines. The city must 
have two separate political sovereignties yet remain physically united. It might thus become a model of 
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coexistence and cooperation between the two states" (Fahmy 2004,15). Indeed, Jerusalem has been a 
city where a great degree of mutual understanding between religions has historically taken place. 
The views of a former United Nations Observer in Israel at the height of the Cold War sum up 
this position eloquently: If Jerusalem is "ever to become a city of peace ... its foundations will have to be 
based on justice and not falsehood. This means that the Arabs will have to regain that part of the City 
which was theirs until 1967 and that the whole City must be a place where Arabs and Jews can come 
together in confidence and understanding. Were this to happen in one place, it is conceivable that 
understanding might spread further, and that in this way Jerusalem might become the seed from which 
a general reconciliation between Arabs and Jews would grow" (Bull 1973,43). It seems that the holiness 
of Jerusalem, that which makes it so coveted, might be the root of its problems. Arabs and Jews have 
had very little diffICulty cohabitating in cities without the spiritual allure of Jerusalem. Take the city of 
Haifa in Northern Israel in the final days of Britain's Mandate in Palestine, for instance: "The work of the 
Haifa Municipality rests on the fundamental presupposition that neither section of the population 
should be allowed to dominate the other •.. a striving for cooperation, on the other hand, results in 
actual cooperation" (Smelansky 1947, 66). Along the same idealistic .vein, the Jerusalem Old City 
Initiative, a research project undertaken at the University of Windsor, outlines how and when a joint 
Palestinian-Israeli task force would govern the Old City together, effectively sharing sovereignty and 
taking into account the diplomatic, security, governance, development and religiOUS concerns present· 
between two mutually fearful and distrustful populations (Bell et al. 2009). Fina"y, it is vital that each 
side strive to bring the best possible future out of themselves and each other for this type of solution to 
work. If this sounds too idealistic, it should be remembered that even conflict resolution theories at 
once seemed utopian in the eyes of classical orthodox realists. In the words of Alan Dershowitz, 11 A two-
state solution ... holds enormous promise for both the Palestinians and the Israelis ... By abandoning 
unrealistic claims and recognizing each other's right to live in peace, Israel and Palestine can become 
beacons of enlightenment, progress and hope in an increasingly dangerous world" (Dershowitz 2003, 
243). 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that there exists a severe lack of regional integration in the Middle East, and 
that among many causal factors, the most serious is the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the centre of which rests 
the Palestinian-Israeli struggle for survival. These conflicts not only impede the growth of a mutually 
beneficial regional order, but they also provide no opportunity for intercultural dialogue, peace or 
security for the peoples of the Middle East. International relations theories based on realism were 
explored in order to get a better grasp on the inability of regional leaders to overcome their differences 
and reconcile national interests with international security and stability. Essentially, the argument being 
made is that there . needs to be a universal realization on both sides of the divide that while realist 
mindsets may lead to temporary increases in power, this fails to easily translate into increased security 
for either side. This is why national security cannot realistically be considered apart from regional and 
international security any longer. (Buzan 1991). Instead, a collaborative and integrated regional order 
can only come about by taking steps to build confidence, reduce misperceptions and eliminate the 
misconceptions that plague both sides (Morgan 1997). 
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With particular reference to the Middle East, conflict resolution theories are not only useful, 
they are necessary to overcome the pessimism that often characterizes the situation in the region. As 
realism and liberalism would agree, only by taking into consideration the positions, interests and needs 
of other regional actors can conflicting positions be broached (Miall et al. 1999). By joining the two 
perspectives and using the comparatively more liberal conflict resolution theories, the explanatory 
power of realism's conflict management is transfomied into the prescriptive power of liberalism's 
conflict resolution. Hopefully, this could help to overcome the mutually hurting stalemates and reach 
the long awaited Arab-Israeli compromise (Zartman 2003), including on the highly coveted city of 
Jerusalem. Conflicts that were once thought to be similarly intractable have been resolved in Northern 
Ireland, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia, among others. Why, then, should optimists· stop 
praying, hoping, debating, reading, researching and writing for the deeply-sought and long-overdue end 
to violence and the beginning of peace in the Middle East. 
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